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An island rife with PbR…
PbR pilots in the CJS
• HMP Peterborough Social Impact Bond – Sodexo and St 
Giles Trust
• HMP Doncaster PbR pilot – Serco and Catch 22
• Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot – 6 sites (Greater 
Manchester and 5 London Boroughs)
• Youth Justice Reinvestment Custody Pathfinder – 4 
sites: West Yorks, Birmingham, North and East London 
Partnership, West London (now 2 sites)
Transforming rehabilitation…
What is PbR designed to do – for the commissioner?
• PbR transfers risk away from the government/commissioner 
towards the service provider - specifically from the public 
sector to the private and/or voluntary and community sector
• Payment may be deferred or ‘clawed back’
• Incentivise the delivery of more cost effective services –
deliver better outcomes at reduced cost
• Reduce costs 
At a societal level – reduce levels of offending/re-offending
What is PbR designed to do  – for service providers?
• Service providers are free of bureaucracy, micro-
management and are able to focus on delivering better 
services
• Incentivise innovation
• Encourages new market entrants - VCS and private sector 
and/or new consortia of public sector/VCS/private sector
At a societal level – reduce levels of offending/re-offending
What are the key issues?
• Design
• Implementation
• Change
1. Design
How much risk?
• Too little…  LJR, Peterborough
• Too much… Pathfinder
• No risk … ‘sub-contracted’ service providers (except in two 
cases, LJR and YJP)
Limited capacity and capability of providers to effectively 
understand and monitor risk 
Payment
• Deferred payment – Peterborough; LJR: no up front payment –
potential reward payment after each test year
• Part of contract cost at risk – repayment if target not met –
Doncaster 
• Payment up front and a proportionate clawback - Pathfinder
Measurement – key dimensions
Conceptual 
complexity
Requirement for 
external data to 
verify outcome
Ability to monitor 
progress towards 
the outcome 
using local data
Time lag to outcome 
determination from 
start of pilot
Local Justice 
Reinvestment
Complex Quarterly data 
from MoJ 
Yes (in part) 16-17 months (at 
end of 1 year)
Pathfinder Simple Quarterly data 
from YJB
Yes 26 months (whole of 
the pilot)
Doncaster Simple Aggregate 
quarterly data 
from MoJ
No/Limited 30 months (first 
cohort)
Peterborough Simple but 
complex
Huge undertaking Limited 48 months
Outcome measures – HMP Doncaster
• Reducing 
• in their use of custody bed nights – a bespoke figure 
calculated for each area of between 10% and 20%, from an 
agreed 2010/11 baseline.  
• Overall, Pathfinder aims to reduce the use of custody 
(measured via bed nights) by approximately 60 beds
Outcome measures – Pathfinder (demand reduction)
• Reduction in their use of custody bed nights – a bespoke 
figure calculated for each area of between 10% and 20%, 
from an agreed 2010/11 baseline.  
• Overall, Pathfinder aims to reduce the use of custody 
(measured via bed nights) by approximately 60 beds
Outcome measures – Peterborough (reoffending)
• Short term prisoners
• 3 cohorts of 1000 prisoners
• The length of time to form each cohort will be determined by the time required for 1,000 
unique short-sentence prisoners to be released from HMP Peterborough, but will not be 
longer than 24 months per cohort. Therefore, the cohort may be less than 1,000 should 
not enough prisoners be released from HMP Peterborough over the 24-month period. 
• MoJ will pay the investment vehicle a fixed unit payment for each reduced conviction 
event in a SIB cohort less than a matched baseline cohort, providing the reduction in 
conviction events in the SIB cohort is at least 10%. If a 10% reduction is not achieved for 
any of the three cohorts, payment will be made if a 7.5% reduction is achieved at the end 
of the pilot across all cohorts together 
• Independent Assessor appointed to develop PSM methodology that will be used to define 
a Comparison Group to reduce pre-existing differences on measured variables between 
those released from HMP Peterborough and those released from ‘other prisons
Outcome measures – Local Justice Reinvestment (demand reduction)
Cohort Metric
Adult Conviction count for custodial sentences of less than 12 months
Conviction count for community orders (CO) and suspended sentence orders (SSO)
Conviction count for all non-custody and non-court order sentences
Total months sentenced for custodial sentences of less than 12 months
Total requirements sentenced by requirement type for COs and SSOs:
   - Accredited programme
   - Unpaid work
   - Drug treatment
   - Supervision
   - Specified activity
   - Mental health
   - Alcohol treatment
   - Residence
   - Exclusion
   - Prohibited activity
   - Attendance centre
   - Curfew (EM tagging)
Youth Conviction count for custodial sentences of less than 2 years
Conviction count for community orders (CO)
Conviction count for all non-custody and non-court order sentences
Total months sentenced for custodial sentences of less than 2 years
(Ministry of Justice 
2013)
The perils of co-designing and 
allowing for local variation?
Capacity and capability of 
commissioners and providers to provide 
and analyse data is critical for setting 
outcomes and monitoring performance
Cashability
• What savings can be derived from outcomes delivered 
through the criminal justice system?
• Where do those savings fall?
Cashability? – Local Justice Reinvestment 
Cohort Metric Measure Price 
Adult Custody convictions Conviction count for custodial sentences 
of less than 12 months 
£440 
 Custody months  Total months sentenced for custodial 
sentences of less than 12 months 
£360 
 Court order convictions Conviction count for community orders 
and suspended sentence orders 
£440 
 Court order requirements 
 
Total requirements given to offenders by 
requirement type: 
 
     - Accredited programme £430 
     - Unpaid work £290 
      - Drug treatment £270 
     - Supervision £270 
     - Specified activity £230 
     - Mental health £220 
     - Alcohol treatment £170 
     - Residence £150 
     - Curfew £550 
     - Exclusion £150 
     - Prohibited activity £150 
     - Attendance centre £190 
 Other convictions Conviction count for non-custody and 
non-court order sentences  
£300 
 
(Ministry of 
Justice 2013)
Local Justice Reinvestment - Cashable saving V Cost
Cashable/realisable ‘saving’ made through reducing by 
one month a custodial sentence of under twelve months = 
£360   
Estimated average monthly cost of a custodial sentence 
of under twelve months = £2,553* 
(*Based on £30,637, the annual resource expenditure cost per prisoner 
in a Category C prison -Ministry of Justice 2012)
Pathfinder – cashability? 
Cashable/realisable ‘saving’ - average weighted bed price 
across the secure youth estate, i.e. Young Offender 
Institution (YOI), Secure Training Centre and Secure 
Children’s Home (Youth Justice Board 2010)
Scale: At least 50 young people in custody at any one time
(Youth Justice Board 2011)
Scale & commissioning/jurisdictional structures
• Need for scaleable interventions which are proven to be 
cost effective
• Geographical scale or a sufficient population/throughput 
of offenders which would allow scaleable interventions to 
deliver savings 
• Operational co-terminosity between key CJS agencies –
Police, Probation, Courts, PCC, Prisons (relative co-
terminosity)
• Commissioning co-terminosity – finding the right level 
2. Implementation
Evidence and learning
Evidence
•A limited evidence base for ‘what works’ ? – (perception…)
•Little cost benefit analysis has been undertaken to enable 
cost effective assessments to be made
•Limited use of evidence to inform decisions on what 
interventions to choose
Learning
•Limited or no performance management – not mandated or 
required through commissioning process
•Limited incentives to learn from what you’re doing
PbR is unforgiving of mediocre and 
poor delivery
Capability of providers  
Strategic level
•Be able to create a vision which links PbR to local priorities and concerns
Operational management level
•Be effective at project/service implementation and change management
•Be able to command credibility with front line staff and obtain buy in to changes
•Be able to interpret data and act on it quickly
•Relentless drive to deliver
Operational level
•Capability to collate and analyse data to inform delivery decisions
•Ability and commitment to implement effective practice and be flexible and willing to 
adapt to new work practices
Capability of commissioners 
Commissioning
•Be able to set an outcome measure that is achievable (requires data analysis 
capacity and capability)
•Be able to write flexibility into the contract to address unforeseen  events (e.g. 
disturbances) 
•Balancing risk with achievability
Facilitating and supporting delivery?
•Is it the role of commissioners to ensure capacity and capability to deliver?
“We don’t do failure”
3. What’s changed?
Innovation (or doing something different) 
is not guaranteed
Partnership is a means to an end…
Innovation?
• Justice Reinvestment as criminal justice system re-
design 
• Justice Reinvestment as social justice 
• Through the gate provision for non-statutory 
offenders?
• Integrated Offender Management?
• Investment vehicle?
West Yorkshire Pathfinder - systems model 
1. Reducing breaches – more effective engagement with 
young people and families
2. Reducing custodial sentences – offering robust 
community packages 
3. Reducing remands into custody 
4. Reducing duration of custodial sentences
Potential for perverse incentives?
• Don’t breach…
• Focus on very low level ‘offending’  
• Stop interventions…
• Commit serious crime…
Have they achieved the outcomes?
Pathfinder – Year 1 Results
No. of 
custody bed 
nights 
Baseline 
Year 
(Apr 2010 to 
Mar 2011)
Target 
number of 
custody bed 
nights in Year 
Two (Oct 
2012 to Sept 
2013)
Target 
percentage 
reduction of 
custody bed 
nights in 
Year Two 
(Oct 2012 to 
Sept 2013)
No. of 
custody bed 
nights in 
Year One 
(Oct 2011 to 
Sept 2012) 
Percentage 
change 
between 
Year One 
and the 
baseline 
Site 1 47,157 37,725 -20% 34,938 -26%
Site 2 20,262 17,871 -12% 21,086 +4%
Site 3 50,069 44,061 -12% 57,324 +14%
Site 4 27,649 22,396 -19% 33,934 +23% 
(Wong et al 2013)
Local Justice Reinvestment – Year 1 results
Change in 
demand (adult) 
(%)
Change in 
demand 
(youth) (%)
Year 1 payment 
(£000)
Greater Manchester -8.4 -21.1 2,670
Southwark -12.5 -29.2 514
Lewisham -6 -20.0 249
Hackney -7.5 n/a 189
Croydon 8.1 6.7 0
Lambeth 4.9 13.4 0
England and Wales -4.5 -13.0 -
London -5.1 0.1 -
(Ministry of Justice 2013)
Transaction costs…
There's nothing (much) new in public policy… 
…but change is inevitable…
Further reading
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-development-and-year-one-
implementation-of-the-local-justice-reinvestment-pilot
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/22
5630/youth-justice-reinvestment-custody.pdf
Justice Reinvestment: Can the Criminal Justice System Deliver More for 
Less by Fox, Albertson and Wong is now available. For more information go 
to: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415500340 /.
Wong, K., Fox, C., Albertson, K. (Forthcoming) Justice Reinvestment in an “age 
of austerity” – Developments in the United Kingdom, Victims and Offenders, 
Routledge
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